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No Hiding Place

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McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B., and Carroll, Maurice. *No Hiding Place*. New York: Times Books, 1981. 314pp. $15.50

On Sunday, 17 May 1981, *The New York Times Magazine* was devoted exclusively to an account of the hostages crisis between the United States and Iran that dominated much of America's attention during the election year of 1980. Now, in *No Hiding Place*, *The New York Times* has published an amended version of the same account. It begins with a long (142 page) "inside" story based on interviews with 20 of the returned hostages, information from four others at news conferences, and accounts provided by 14 of the hostages to other news organizations. Part II is a collection of six essays interpreting aspects of the crisis. Part III contains brief profiles of the hostages and a chronology of selected significant events from the flight of the Shah and his entourage from Iran on 16 January 1979 to the freeing on 18 February 1981 of Cynthia Dwyer, an American free-lance journalist who had been imprisoned on charges of espionage in Iran independently of the hostages crisis. The style is facile and journalistic.

From a military point of view, and that of an international lawyer, the most interesting parts of this account are not the lively stories of the travail of the hostages, as absorbing as those are for their reportage of how some mature professionals reacted to imprisonment and barely tolerable emotional strain. Neither is it the recitation of the aborted rescue mission of 24 April 1980 which seems factual but lightly done, with due regard for military and diplomatic information that is probably best not yet revealed.

What is more interesting and revealing, albeit unwittingly so, is the apparent insensitivity of *The Times* analysts and American planners as a group to the vital political and legal issues involved in the year-long crisis. Four points seem particularly enlightening.

On page 109 of *The New York Times Magazine* for 17 May one finds that "the United States was not obliged to inform friendly governments that a group of C-130s scheduled to land at out-of-the-way American bases within their countries were destined for a rescue mission in Iran." That assertion is both false as a matter of law and inept as a matter of policy. Our Turkish bases, for example, are linked with NATO, and to use them for non-NATO operations in the Middle East would come close to forcing Turkey to close them down. Whatever landing rights we might hold elsewhere in the Middle East either involve similar political complications of serious magnitude or involve overflights of Muslim states which would bring on equivalent problems. In *No Hiding Place* the sentence quoted is gone, replaced by a speculation: "But given the need for secrecy, it seems likely that they took off from a second aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea or the Indian Ocean" (p. 216, analysis by Drew Middleton).

President Carter's decision to approve the rescue mission of April 1980 is reported to have been based on his "feeling" early in April "that he had exhausted his diplomatic and economic options" (p. 209, analysis by Terence Smith). If that was President Carter's true feeling, he was badly served by his advisers. In fact, on 7 and 17 April, he had just imposed new and stringent economic restrictions on Iran. Did he expect them to work instantly?

It was also apparent in April that the International Court of Justice was about to announce a decision in the complaint brought by the United States against

Iran. That decision was expected to be wholly favorable to the United States, as indeed it was when it finally came down on 24 May, having been delayed by the need some members of the Court apparently felt to mention the rescue mission as a disturbing, if legally irrelevant, action by the United States in disregard of a standstill Court order of 15 December 1979.

While in April it could not have been expected that Iran would be moved by that decision alone, the fact of the Court making it should certainly have been seen as opening various possibilities through the United Nations for action in support of the Court, permitting "neutral" countries to act against Iran even if their internal politics forbade them acting in favor of the United States. It would seem thus that the President was led to approve a risky action by not having been informed fully as to the range of economic and diplomatic alternatives becoming available.

There is reference to "the Iranian concern about dealing directly with 'the great Satan'" (p. 212) as the basis for the complicated arrangement finally hit on in December 1980, with Algeria serving as a negotiating buffer between the two principals. Our chief negotiator, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, acknowledged the delicacy of the Algerian concern "about their role as a mediator and their image with Iran and the third world."

It seems not to have been considered that the decision of the International Court over six months earlier triggered Iranian legal obligations not only toward the United States, but also toward the entire world community. As a result of that decision the United Nations Secretary General, or the President of the General Assembly, or some other representative of the entire world community would have been in a position in his own right to negotiate with Iran.

Since reportedly the Iranians had decided by 1 September 1980 to release the hostages (pp. 124-125, 128-129, 210-211, 269-270), it is possible to suggest that American ingenuity in coping with Iranian sensitivity actually delayed the release of the hostages by some months; that a fuller understanding of Iranian needs and the legal and political pressures available to help Iran release the hostages without demanding a complex negotiation involving sensitive third parties would have led to a much simpler and quicker release.

The International Court is referred to in this strange way: "[S]elf-righteousness . . . fueled the rage of Americans and sent our diplomats into the World Court, and the more amorphous 'court of international opinion' in a vain attempt to isolate the Iranians by showing how just was our cause" (p. 231, analysis by Steven R. Weisman). It is inconsistent with the facts showing that our taking the case to the Court did indeed isolate Iran diplomatically (p. 211: "American officials were convinced that Rajai [the Iranian Prime Minister in New York to plead the Iranian case in October 1980 before the Security Council of the United Nations] and the leaders in Teheran were surprised and concerned by the degree of Iran's diplomatic isolation"). It also reveals that the author, and possibly the officials whose views contributed to his summary chapter, simply did not understand the processes and the role of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations in modern diplomacy. There was no appeal to an amorphous court of international opinion; self-righteous rage had nothing to do with the decision to take the case to the International Court of Justice.

It is noteworthy that the compilers of *No Hiding Place*, in their otherwise quite detailed chronology leave out the International Court's interim order of 15 December 1979 requiring both sides to refrain from steps that might exacerbate the crisis and saying that the hostages should be released immediately. While it was understood by all that Iranian politics would make it impossible for Iran to obey that order, it clearly signaled the substance of the Court's final judgment and should have colored all the subsequent American actions. The chronology also leaves out any mention of the Executive Order of 7 April 1980, which became one of the major stumbling blocks to the final settlement, mentioning only the minor amendments of ten days later as if they were the earlier Order.

The hostage crisis contains deep lessons for American military and diplomatic professionals, but *No Hiding Place* is merely an account that is both incomplete and superficial.

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Hurt, Henry. *Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. 301pp. $13.95

"The double agent," declared the late Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, in his *Great True Spy Stories* (1968), "is one of the most intriguing figures in the annals of espionage." And the British counterintelligence specialist, Sir John Masterman, in the *Double-Cross System* (1972), has ticked off no less than a dozen principles that should govern their utilization. It is safe to affirm that both these authorities would have relished the present volume. Written by a roving editor of the *Reader's Digest*, it is almost wholly given over to an analysis of the circumstances surrounding a double-agent operation.

Despite the global resources of his magazine in locating people and tracking down facts, Mr. Hurt remains not fully certain as to what, or who, caused the disappearance in Vienna at the Christmas season, 1975, of one of this country's most valued secret agents, the former Soviet naval officer Nikolai F. Artamonov (who after defection assumed the name Nicholas George Shadrin). He was the youngest man ever to command a Soviet destroyer, the highest-ranking Soviet naval person ever to defect to the United States, and, in the opinion of an intelligence officer who knew him intimately, Commander Thomas Dwyer, "one of the most valuable military defectors in U.S. history." In addition to all that, Nick Shadrin had proved himself out as a thoroughly likable human being; one, moreover, who suffered from few if any of the personality disturbances so often afflicting the turncoat in an alien land.

His motivation? Disgust with the Soviet system, a revulsion that had "Come out gradually, tiptoeing from his mind in cautious fashion," until one fine night he picked up his Polish fiancée and sailed themselves across the Baltic to Sweden, thence in due course to America. The bulk of the book discusses Shadrin's adaptation to life in his new country and the way in which his impressive knowledge was used, or misused, by the authorities in our intelligence community. His reputation there became pervasive and prominent. Suffice to say that it gained him such friends as Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson and Rear Admiral Rufus Taylor and that, following his vanishment from Vienna's byways, the pursuit of his case by his indomitable wife penetrated to the Oval Office of presidents Ford and